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Abstract 
The price-earnings effect has been thoroughly documented and is the subject of numerous academic 
studies. However, in existing research it has almost exclusively been calculated on the basis of the 
previous year’s earnings. We show that the power of the effect has until now been seriously 
underestimated due to taking too short-term a view of earnings. Looking at all UK companies since 
1975, using the traditional P/E ratio we find the difference in average annual returns between the value 
and glamour deciles to be 6%. This is similar to other authors’ findings. We are able to almost double 
the value premium by calculating the P/E ratio using earnings averaged over the previous eight years.  
 
1 Introduction 
The ratios of a stock's current price to its earnings over the last company year (historical P/E) 
and to analysts' consensus forecast earnings for this year (prospective P/E) are widely quoted 
statistics. The price-earnings effect was the earliest described asset pricing 'anomaly' even 
before the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) itself was formulated by Sharpe (1964). A 
large body of academic work has demonstrated the effect and has attempted to decide whether 
it is real or a proxy for other factors.
1
 The first study demonstrating the P/E effect was by 
Nicholson (1960), who concluded that ‘The purchaser of common stocks may logically seek 
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the greater productivity represented by stocks with low rather than high price-earnings ratios.’ 
Basu (1975) and (1977) generally confirmed Nicholson's results.  
 
The PE effect has defied rational explanation. Ball (1978), while conceding the apparent 
existence of such effects, considered various possible explanations for this anomaly, including 
systematic experimental error, transaction and processing costs, and a failure of Sharpe’s two-
parameter CAPM model. Fuller, Huberts and Levinson (1993) re-examined Ball's (1978) 
argument by using a comprehensive multi-factor model that allowed for systematic risk 
(beta), 55 industry classification factors and 13 other explanatory factors for 'risk' such as 
earnings variability, leverage and foreign income. They again found higher returns for low 
P/E stocks from 1973-1990, but the factors included in the model did not account for the 
superior low P/E returns.  
 
Banz and Breen (1986) criticised previous studies into the size and P/E effects as suffering 
from two major biases: ex-post-selection bias and look-ahead bias. They eliminated these 
factors by amassing their own database from the COMPUSTAT tapes for 1974-81 that 
accurately reflected the companies in existence and the data available to investors at that time. 
Their conclusion was that although a company size effect persisted, the P/E effect was no 
longer significant, i.e. that the data biases had created the apparent P/E effect. Jaffe, Keim and 
Westerfield (1989) considered the January effect as well as the size and P/E effects. They 
found that the conflicting results of earlier studies could be ascribed to time-variation in the 
power of the different effects.  
 
Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1994) ('LSV' hereafter) defined value strategies as buying 
shares with low prices compared to some indicator of fundamental value such as earnings, 
book value, dividends or cash flow. They divided firms into 'value' or 'glamour' stocks on the 
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basis of past growth in sales and expected future growth as implied by the current P/E ratio. 
LSV argued that value strategies provide higher returns because they exploit the sub-optimal 
behaviour of investors. They found little, if any, support for the view that value strategies 
were fundamentally riskier. Value stocks outperformed glamour stocks quite consistently, 
yielding particularly strong abnormal returns during market downturns. However, Fama and 
French (1993 and 1996) found that value stock anomalies could be successfully explained by 
a three-factor model involving market returns, size and book to market value. But unlike the 
CAPM, there was no theoretical underpinning offered as to why these factors and not others 
should be important.  
 
The P/E effect has been observed in many stock markets,
2
 although there are considerably 
fewer studies investigating the existence and possible justifications for a value effect in the 
UK. Levis (1989) was the first such study, finding strong results in favour of a value 
premium. Levis and Liodakis (2001) focused on ascribing the source of the value anomaly to 
either investors' naive extrapolations of past sales and earnings growth, as put forward by 
LSV, or to systematic errors in analysts' forecasts of long-term growth. They used data on 
3,131 non-financial companies with only a single class of share between 1968 and 1997. By 
looking at EPS growth for five years both before and after portfolio formation, they showed 
that companies in the lowest P/E decile experienced low EPS growth over the five years prior 
to portfolio formation but improved growth thereafter. EPS growth exhibited mean reversion. 
Thus the anomalies could be ascribed to prior losers becoming winners and vice-versa, as 
suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). However the pattern of growth did not fit the naive 
extrapolation hypothesis of LSV. Instead, Levis and Liodakis used I/B/E/S earnings forecast 
                                                 
2
 In addition to the above research, countries for which P/E effect studies have been carried out include: thirteen 
countries around the world (Fama and French (1998)); the UK (Levis (1989); Gregory et al. (2001); Levis and 
Liodakis (2001)); the UK and several European countries together (Brouwer et al. (1997); Bird and Whitaker 
(2003)); Holland (Doeswijk (1997)); Finland (Booth et al. (1994)); Japan (Aggarwal et al. (1990); Chan et al. 
(1991); Cai (1997); Park and Lee (2003)); Taiwan (Chou and Johnson (1990)); New Zealand (Chin et al. 
(2002)). 
  
 5 
data to show that positive surprises have a large effect on value stocks and a small effect on 
glamour stocks, and vice-versa for negative surprises. 
 
Previous research has, to the best of our knowledge, always used the same approach to 
calculating the E/P (the inverse of the P/E ratio): the previous year’s earnings, divided by the 
share price at the time of portfolio formation. However, there is no reason why only earnings 
from the previous year should be relevant in valuing companies. As Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) state, annual earnings are quite noisy as a measure of fundamental value. The concept 
of ‘value’ may well be better captured by focusing on permanent rather than transient 
earnings. We have been unable to find any previous academic research into whether 
knowledge of earnings of previous years will improve the ability of the P/E ratio to predict 
future returns on individual shares. Graham and Dodd (1934, p.452) recommended the use of 
average earnings over a period of at least five years and preferably over seven to ten years, to 
give the analyst a more reliable view of the true value of a company. Yet their conjecture does 
not seem to have been tested by any academic research. Campbell and Shiller (1988) and 
Shiller (2000) appear to be the only existing investigations into the value of multi-year 
earnings averages. They examined earnings over the stock index as a whole, however, rather 
than at the level of individual companies with reference to the P/E effect.  
 
We find that adding more years of earnings history increases the power of the P/E ratio to 
predict returns, although this does not happen monotonically. Using eight years of earnings 
rather than one, the difference between the returns of the glamour and value deciles is almost 
doubled. The simplest approach to enhancing the usefulness of the E/P ratio is to assign 
stocks to value and glamour portfolios using earnings averaged over two to eight years. 
However, equal weights are not necessarily optimal in forming a P/E statistic that is the most 
efficient predictor of returns. We investigate some alternative and intuitive weighting systems. 
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We also calculate the predictive value of individual past years of returns. The best weighting 
we find is from adding the earnings from last year to the earnings from eight years ago and 
ignoring the intervening six years. This is perhaps due to the low correlation between the 
earnings from these two years. Our search is, however, not exhaustive. 
 
Finally, we attempt to deal with three possible criticisms of our approach. Using weights 
derived from a regression across our whole time period may fairly be criticised as suffering 
from a look-ahead bias. In order to investigate whether our results would be robust to the use 
of different years or using a different number of years of data, we employ rolling five-year 
periods. We find that our optimum weighting, or something very similar, has been the 
optimum over most five-year periods during the past twenty years. We also calculate the 
effect of bid-ask spreads on returns and show that transactions costs can only account for a 
small proportion of the difference in returns between the value and glamour deciles. Finally 
we investigate whether the trades of typical investors would cause liquidity problems for 
small company shares. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology 
employed in the calculations of long-term P/E ratios and decile portfolio returns. Section 3 
presents the decile returns using the different lengths of earnings histories, where the past 
years of earnings are all equally weighted. Section 4 uses t-tests, standard deviations and 
Sharpe ratios to examine the significance of the differences in returns. Section 5 investigates 
the usefulness of various weighting schemes for the past earnings figures. Section 6 calculates 
the effects of the bid-ask spread on decile returns and further examines the riskiness of long-
value-short-glamour strategies. It also considers whether the stocks involved are likely to be 
sufficiently liquid. Section 7 presents a portfolio illustration. Section 8 concludes. 
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2 Data Sources and Methodology 
Initially, we collated a list of companies from the London Business School’s ‘London Share 
Price Database’ (LSPD) for the period 1975 to 2003. The LSPD holds data commencing 
1955, but only a sample of one-third of companies is held until 1975. Thereafter, data are held 
for every UK listed company. We therefore only employ data from 1975. We excluded 
financial sector companies including investment trusts and companies with more than one 
type of share - for instance, voting and non-voting shares. Apportioning the earnings between 
the different share types would be problematic. 
 
Earnings data are available on LSPD, but only for the previous financial year. We therefore 
used Datastream to collect all other series, as this service is able to provide time series data on 
most of the statistics it covers, including earnings. A four-month gap is allowed between the 
year of earnings being studied and portfolio formation, to ensure that all earnings data used 
would have been available at the time. We therefore requested for each company as at 1
st
 May 
in each year 1975-2003, normalised earnings for the past eight years, the current price and the 
returns index on that date and a year later. 
 
A common criticism of academic studies of stock returns is that the reported returns could not 
actually have been achieved in reality, due to the presence of very small companies or highly 
illiquid shares. In an attempt at least to avoid the worst examples, we excluded companies if 
the share mid-price was less than 5p. We also excluded the lowest 5% of shares by market 
capitalisation in each year. We checked whether this removal of “micro-cap” and penny 
shares had a significant effect on returns. Penny shares and micro-caps did indeed contribute 
to returns, although this contribution was across all deciles, not just for value shares. Average 
returns were 1-1.5% higher when all companies are included, across all deciles and holding 
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periods. An arbitrage strategy that is long in value companies and short in glamour companies 
would therefore be largely unaffected by the exclusion of very small companies and of penny 
shares. In Section 7 we also examine the impact of transactions costs, which are likely to be 
larger for small firms. A further criticism of many studies is that they do not deal 
appropriately with bankruptcies. Companies that failed (i.e. were bankrupted) during the year 
are flagged in the LSPD. In such cases, we set the price manually to zero, as in Datastream it 
often becomes fixed at the last traded price. We thus assumed a 100% loss of the investment 
in that company in such cases.  
 
We calculated up to eight E/P statistics for each company/year return, by dividing the sum of 
the earnings over the previous one to eight years by the current stock price: 
i
n
j
ij
i
nP
EPS
EPn



1
         (1) 
where ijEPS  is the normalised earnings per share for company i for j years ago, iP  is the 
current price of company i and n is the number of years of earnings used in the EPn 
calculation. As earnings would be expected to rise on average over time with inflation, there 
is a small implicit weighting of the later earnings in favour of the earlier ones, in cases where 
more than one year of earnings is used. Where Datastream reported a company as having a 
zero EPS, i.e. normalised earnings were negative, or there was no EPS recorded for one or 
more previous years, EPn for those year(s) could not be calculated.
3
 We therefore had to 
exclude the company from further analysis for that EPn. Due to these factors, the number of 
companies for each EPn calculation gradually reduces as the EPS figure becomes unavailable 
for years further into the past, from 40,000 initially to 16,000 that have a full eight years of 
positive earnings history. 
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We then sorted shares by EPn, grouped them into deciles within each year and calculated the 
returns for each decile for the subsequent year as if it were an independent portfolio. In fact 
we calculated returns for holding periods of up to eight years, but the results are usually 
qualitatively unaltered from those for one-year returns so in most cases we do not report them. 
Where we used a weighted average of past earnings, the E/P for the i
th
 company/year return 
was calculated as 





8
1
8
1
j
j
j
ijj
i
Wt
EPSWt
EP          (2) 
where jWt  is the weight for the earnings for the j
th
 year and ijEPS  is the normalised earnings 
per share for company/year return i from individual past year j (one to eight years previously). 
The right-hand side is thus a weighted average of the past eight years of earnings divided by 
the current share price. The weights vary according to the weighting scheme and are 
explained in Section 3. 
 
Section 6 considers the effect of the bid-ask spread on the decile returns. Bid and ask prices 
were first recorded on Datastream in 1987 but for the majority of companies are only 
available from 1991. Where the actual bid-ask spread was available for that company on that 
day we used it, calculating the returns after allowing for spread losses. To cater for companies 
for which bid and ask prices were not available, we divided companies into 20 categories by 
market capitalisation within each year and calculated the average bid-ask spread for each 
category. Companies for which bid-ask spreads were not available then used the average bid-
ask spread for their category. We applied no transaction cost where a share remained in a 
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particular decile portfolio for more than one year, since selling and re-purchasing the share 
would be unnecessary. 
 
3 Returns for the Long-Term P/E Ratio 
In this section we report the main initial results of the investigation, showing the average 
portfolio returns by P/E decile. We present the results first in Table 1, showing the 
distribution of returns after using the EP1–EP8 statistics (i.e. based on 1-8 years of earnings 
history) to sort companies into decile portfolios. The difference in returns does increase as one 
takes more years of past earnings into account, but not monotonically: in particular there is a 
dip for EP2 and EP3, so that calculating P/E ratios using the previous two or three years of 
earnings is less rewarding than using only the previous year’s earnings. This is reminiscent of 
the pattern of reversals identified by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who noted an initial 
underperformance of their loser portfolios, but outperformance in years two and three. In the 
current case, high earnings two and three years ago tend to indicate poorer performance in the 
future. The value premium when using four or five years of earnings is quite similar to that 
obtained using only the previous year’s earnings, but the superiority of using six years or 
more is clear. Using a full eight years of past earnings, which is the cut-off point for our 
database, gives a value premium almost twice that of EP1.  
 
Panel A of Table 1 uses all the available company/year returns to compute the EP. This results 
in the number of companies included in the deciles decreasing monotonically from left to 
right across the table, as we require an increasing number of years of earnings history to 
compute the EP. In order to ensure that the results are comparable across EPn for n =1,8, we 
recomputed the EPn in Panel B of Table 1 using only firms with a full eight years of earnings 
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history throughout
4
. Requiring firms to have a full eight years of earnings history leads to 
higher returns for the value decile but little change in the returns for the growth decile, so that 
the long-value-short-growth arbitrage strategy returns are increased by around 2-3% for EP1 
through to EP7. Figure 1 compares the returns using EP1 as the basis of assignment of 
companies to deciles, to using EP8. Returns for the one-third of shares with high P/E’s are 
poorer using EP8 compared to EP1. D8 and D9 give quite similar returns, but the extreme 
value decile for EP8 gives returns a full 3% better per year than the EP1 value decile. 
 
Table 2 examines the impact of employing longer holding periods than one year on the size of 
the value premium. The results suggest that the arbitrage strategy returns are fairly stable 
across holding periods of 1 to 4 years but decline thereafter. This reduction in performance as 
the holding period increases beyond four years is because the best returns for low P/E 
companies are in the early years. On the other hand, the high P/E company returns peak 
sharply in the first year, but actually get slightly worse over long holding periods. This may 
be due to companies with share price momentum having high prices and thus high P/E’s. As 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) showed, the momentum effect peaks over a twelve-month 
holding period but declines rapidly thereafter.  
4 Significance Tests 
In this section we investigate whether the more extreme returns observed from using longer 
periods of earnings represent a statistically significant improvement. We also look briefly at 
the standard deviations and Sharpe ratios of the portfolios of one-year returns, to determine 
whether it is reasonable to view the higher returns as merely a fair payment for taking on 
greater risk. 
 
                                                 
4
 The results for EP8 are therefore identical across Panels A and B of Table 1.  
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We conducted paired sample, two-tailed t-tests to determine whether using two to eight years 
of past earnings as the rule to assign companies to deciles gave returns different to those using 
EP1. For deciles 1 to 9 there were no more significant results than would be expected from 
chance alone, so we do not report these. However, there were significant results for the value 
decile. These are shown in Panel A of Table 3. When using EP6-EP8 as the statistic for 
assigning companies to deciles there are significantly superior returns for every holding 
period longer than one year. For the value decile alone, insisting that value companies have 
six or more years of positive earnings history significantly increases returns. This leads us to 
the important conclusion that value investors using a P/E filter should insist on a long history 
of positive earnings for the companies in their portfolio. There is however no significant 
evidence that it is of use to mainstream investors. 
 
We also conducted t-tests to determine whether the D10-D1 value premium is significantly 
different for EP2 through to EP8 as compared to EP1. The results are shown in Panel B of 
Table 3. Although using longer periods of earnings gives no significant results for a one-year 
holding period, the level of significance increases as the holding period and number of years 
taken into account increases, until for a holding period of eight years EP8 is statistically 
significantly better at discriminating returns than EP1 at the 0.1% level. In results not 
reported, we also regressed the annualised value premium against the number of years of 
earnings taken into account
5
. The number of years over which the earnings are measured did 
not significantly affect the value premium for one-year holding periods, but it was significant 
at the 5% level for a two-year holding period. This significance increased progressively to the 
0.1% level for an eight-year holding period. 
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Figure 2 shows the standard deviation of returns for a one-year holding period. There is a 
marked V-shape, with the lowest standard deviations being for deciles four and five. 
Anecdotally, it is widely believed that there are years when investing in value shares gives the 
best returns, but there are other years such as 1999-2000 when glamour stocks are superior. 
Possibly, the shares that fall into the middle deciles give more consistent returns over the 
years, even though their returns in absolute terms are not as good as those for the value decile. 
The very high standard deviation of returns for the glamour decile under EP1 is noticeable. 
This reduces gradually as one moves towards the back of the chart, so that the standard 
deviation for the glamour decile is one-third less when using EP8 than when using EP1. For 
the value decile, on the other hand, the standard deviations are almost the same running from 
EP1 to EP8, even though the returns for EP8 are almost double those for EP1. 
 
In order to decide whether the higher returns are sufficient compensation for their higher 
variability, we look at the Sharpe Ratios of the portfolios. These are calculated as the excess 
return of the portfolio over the risk-free rate, divided by the standard deviation. We used the 
three-month Treasury bill rate as the proxy for the risk-free rate. The Sharpe ratios for a one-
year holding period can be seen in Figure 3. The proportion of excess returns compared to 
standard deviation increases consistently as one moves from the glamour to the value decile. 
The Sharpe Ratio is particularly bad for the EP1 glamour decile and particularly good for the 
EP7 and EP8 value deciles. These deciles offer a ratio of excess returns to standard deviation 
more than twice as high as the EP1 glamour decile. Clearly the higher returns for the EP8 
value decile cannot be ascribed to the investor having taken on greater risk. 
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5 Optimal Weights for the Long-Term P/E 
So far, we have used equal weights for each year of past earnings. There is no particular 
reason why this should produce the best resolution, i.e. the largest difference in annual returns 
between the glamour and value deciles. A priori, one would expect the most recent year’s 
earnings to be more useful in predicting future returns than more historically remote years of 
earnings. Unfortunately, a full examination of the universe of possible weighting rules is not 
possible due to the sheer number of possibilities
6
. We instead look initially at some other 
examples of weights that are simple and justifiable, such as monotonically increasing and 
decreasing weights and the results of a linear regression of the eight year EP’s against one-
year returns. Next we look at the predictive powers of individual years of past earnings. We 
then consider how incorporating additional years of earnings improves the predictive powers 
of the E/P statistic. Finally, to try to ensure that the analysis does not suffer from look-ahead 
bias, we test the best weighting rules against rolling five-year periods of returns to see which 
rules would have performed best over various sub-periods within our sample. 
 
In this section, we used only the 16,000-company/year returns that have positive normalised 
earnings for each of the past eight years. This subset of the data should contain the most 
information that the P/E has to offer about future returns. Note that in order to assign weights, 
we are now considering individual past years of earnings divided by the current share price, 
not the sum of the past n years. EP8 has as its numerator the sum of the last eight years of 
earnings; EPM8 (i.e. EP minus eight) has as its numerator the individual earnings figure from 
eight years ago. The denominator is the same for both: the share price as at the date of 
portfolio formation. 
 
                                                 
6
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Returns using Individual EPMn’s 
Before looking at more complex weighting schemes, we first test each EPMn on its own as a 
predictor of returns so as to get a better appreciation of their individual predictive power. The 
results are shown in Table 4. It can be seen that EPM5 through to EPM8 are, individually, 
better discriminators of future returns than EP1. This is an important and counter-intuitive 
result: calculating the P/E ratio as the ratio of the current stock price to the earnings from five, 
six, seven or eight years ago gives a better predictor of returns than the usual P/E ratio. This 
may be more of a comment on the poor predictive power of EP1 than a serious 
recommendation to predict returns using these earnings that are more remote in time. 
 
EPM2 and EPM3 are on the other hand particularly poor predictors of returns. This may be a 
facet of the reversals of returns over a two- or three-year period observed by De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985), where for the first year previous winners continued to do well but over a two- 
or three-year timescale previous losers showed strong recoveries. In this case the losers are 
not identified directly but by having high E/P’s. The poor performances of EPM2 and EPM3 
and to a lesser extent EPM4 are largely due to the good performance of their glamour deciles, 
which outperform decile 2 by 2-3% in each case. The outperformance of the glamour deciles 
is partly due to companies that would normally fall into the value deciles having one bad year, 
as pointed out by LSV. For example, there were 48 company/year returns that fell into 
EPM3’s glamour decile because they showed particularly weak earnings three years ago, 
when on the basis of an equally weighted average of the other seven years of earnings they 
should have been placed in the value decile. These companies showed average one-year 
returns of 41.6%. 
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Returns from Simple Weighting Schemes 
The simplest possible weighting scheme is equal weights, returns for which we already 
reported in Section 3. In addition, we tried linearly increasing weights, so that the most recent 
year of earnings has the greatest weight, and weights that increase according to an inverse 
square law, so that the most recent year has an even heavier weight. So as to show the relative 
value of more recent years of earnings, we also calculated returns for mirror-image weighting 
schemes that decrease linearly or according to the inverse square law. According to our a 
priori expectations these should perform poorly, since we expect the most recent earnings to 
have the most predictive power. We report decile returns for these weighting schemes in 
columns 1 to 5 of Table 5. 
 
The 11.62% value premium seen in Table 5 for equal weights is the standard against which all 
other results should be measured. If other weighting régimes cannot outperform this simple 
system by a worthwhile margin then the constant weights should be retained. Of the other 
four weighting systems, the reverse weights are best with straight-line reverse weighting 
giving the highest value premium of 12.17%. Both the reverse weighting systems provide 
resolutions considerably superior to those of the ‘forwards’ weighting systems. This is 
contrary to the a priori expectation that more recent earnings would be more relevant to 
predicting returns than earnings further back in time. The explanation can be found in the 
resolutions achieved by the individual EPMn’s reported above: the particularly poor 
predictive power of EPM2 and EPM3 means that any scheme that weights these two heavily 
will perform poorly. The even heavier weight given to EP1 under any ‘forward’ weighting is 
not enough to counterbalance this weakness. 
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Predicting Returns from the EPMn with a Linear Regression 
In order to examine whether a linear regression yields better weights of the historical 
earnings, we ran a regression against the 16,000 company/year returns that have positive 
earnings for each of the last eight years. We expected it to give us an optimal weighting 
system that would outperform any of the resolutions seen so far. The model is 
iiiii
iiiii
uEPMEPMEPMEPM
EPMEPMEPMEPRtn


8765
432101
8765
43210


   (4) 
where Rtn01i is the one-year holding period return for company-year i, EP1 is the EP 
calculated on the basis of the previous year’s earnings, EPMji is the EP calculated from the 
earnings two through to eight years ago and ui is a disturbance term. 
 
The coefficients from the regression are shown in the top part of column 6 in Table 5. EP1, 
EPM3 and EPM4 are significant at the 0.1% level, EPM2 is significant at the 5% level, but 
EPM5-EPM8 are not significant. EP1, in accordance with our expectations, has twice the 
weight of EPM2-EPM4. Earnings more than four years old have small but positive parameter 
values. However, although EPM2 and EPM3 are positive indicators of returns when taken 
alone, when combined with the information available in the other EPMn they have significant 
negative coefficients, entirely contrary to what one would expect. 
 
Looking at the last row of Table 5, the resolution of 11.77% achieved by the linear regression 
is only fractionally better than the 11.62% achieved by using equal weights. It is poorer than 
the resolution of 12.17% for reverse linear weights. This approach does not therefore give 
optimal weights even when using all of the data in a single regression. This result is slightly 
surprising for it suggests that the equal weighting is hard to improve upon even with perfect 
foresight concerning the optimal weights to use. This may be due to some degree of 
collinearity between adjacent EPM figures. It may also be that the regression is a linear one 
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but the portfolio approach to evaluating the power of the price-earnings ratio is inherently 
non-linear
7
. 
 
Returns using Two EPMn’s 
Considering the failure of the linear regression to yield a superior resolution, does combining 
two or more of the EPMn yield better results than the individual EPMn’s? EP1 is the standard 
figure for the P/E ratio. As such it should presumably be included in any weighted average of 
EPMn’s. Table 6 shows the resolutions available from combining EP1 with each of the other 
EPMn figures. We make no attempt to attach fractional weights; the figures for the earnings 
last year and for the earnings n years ago are simply added together, then divided by the 
current share price. The resolution offered by the best weighting scheme found so far, the 
reverse linear weights, is bettered by using EP1 plus EPM8. Also of note is that EP1 plus 
EPM2, and EP1 plus EPM3, give a poorer resolution than EP1 alone. EPM2 and EPM3 when 
included with EP1 have taken away value from the combined statistic, even though when used 
alone EPM2 and EPM3 give a small but nevertheless positive resolution figure. 
 
Some explanation of the observed resolutions of the different EPMn pairs is offered by 
looking at their correlations in Table 7. Correlations between adjacent years of EPMn figures 
are particularly high, in the region 0.7 to 0.8. It is therefore not surprising that if an EP 
statistic is created by adding EPMn figures from adjacent years it adds little resolution to the 
underlying EPMn values. The low 0.28 correlation between EP1 and EPM8, presumably due 
to their remoteness in time to each other, may also explain the high resolution found by 
adding the two values together
8
. 
                                                 
7
 We thank an anonymous referee for proposing this explanation.  
8
 We also examined triple combinations of the EPMn figures. Adding in a third EPMn figure to EP1 and EPM8 
reduced the one-year holding period resolution of the combined statistic in every case except using EPM4. Here, 
the average returns were increased by 0.4%, and Occam’s Razor therefore suggests that the simple (EP1+EPM8) 
statistic be adhered to, rather than adding in a third EPMn.  
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Data Mining? 
The linear regression may fairly be said to suffer from look-ahead bias, in that it takes weights 
derived from a regression on our whole dataset then tests its efficacy over the same 1975 to 
2003 period. Even using this look-ahead bias it is unable to beat some of the simpler 
weighting schemes. Although these simpler schemes do not suffer from look-ahead bias, they 
have also so far only been tested against the entire 1975-2003 period. 
 
We initially calculated the resolutions of some of the best rules for each of the 29 years to see 
whether any one rule predominated. These results are summarised in Table 8. The 
‘EP1+EPM8’ rule gave the best resolution for ten of the twenty-nine years. The 
‘EP1+EPM4+EPM8’ rule gave a slightly higher average resolution but with a higher standard 
deviation and was only best in four years. The linear regression weights gave the best 
resolution in only six years. 
 
We next considered whether the best statistic would have been different had the data been 
collected at another time using a different number of years. Any combination of base year and 
any number of retrospective years could be used, but in order to give some comparability to 
the results, we selected a rolling five-year period. This yields a sufficiently large number of 
company/year returns for each five-year period (at least 2,300). Figure 4 plots the rolling 
(overlapping) five-year average resolution for each of the simple weighting schemes in Table 
8, excluding the linear regression. The resolution in Figure 4 is then the average of the five 
individual year resolutions. The most visible conclusion is that the resolutions follow each 
other quite closely whichever weighting system is chosen. 1982 and 1999 were low points for 
any value-glamour arbitrage strategy. Indeed in 1998 and 1999 every weighting system had 
provided negative returns to the arbitrageur over the previous five years. However, since then 
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there has been a resounding resurgence similar to that seen in 1982-1985. By 2003, average 
resolutions over the previous five years exceeded 20% per year. Over the whole period, no 
one weighting system predominates, but adding the previous year’s earnings to the earnings 
eight years ago is often best. Ascending weights, that might a priori have been thought to be 
the most reasonable as they assign the most weight to the most recent E/P, are often the worst 
amongst the weighting rules charted. The rolling five-year returns at least give some 
confidence that much the same conclusion would have been reached had our investigation 
been carried out at any time over the past 29 years. 
 
6 The Effect of the Bid-Ask Spread, Risk and Liquidity 
It is often suggested that the effectiveness of value-based investment strategies will be much 
reduced once transaction costs are taken into account. Although commission charges 
applicable to the deciles will be similar, since they consist of similar numbers of shares and 
are rebalanced over the same periods, the effect of the bid-ask spread will be different 
between the deciles
9
. As shown below, low P/E firms tend to be smaller companies that have 
larger spreads. How much does allowing for the effect of losses from the bid-ask spread 
reduce the difference in returns between the deciles? A related possible problem is that 
smaller companies are likely to have poorer liquidity. Will the trades of a typical investor 
cause liquidity problems for the shares of small companies that are concentrated in the value 
decile? To determine the impact of transactions costs on strategy returns, we divided 
companies into 20 categories based on market capitalisation, calculated the spreads as they 
affect one-year returns and averaged them over each market value category. The results are 
                                                 
9
 Investors must also pay a 0.5% UK tax known as stamp duty on all share purchases. This will reduce returns by 
up to 0.5% per annum, depending on stock turnover within each decile. Since it will affect the deciles roughly 
equally, we do not incorporate it into our calculations.  
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shown in Table 9 and Figure 5. The spread costs shown in Figure 5 range quite smoothly from 
8.2% for the smallest 5% of companies, to only 0.95% for the largest 5%. 
 
The changes to compound annual returns after allowing for transaction costs using annual 
rebalancing are shown in Table 10. Returns for each decile are shown, with and without the 
bid-ask spread taken into account in one-year returns. Also shown are the average market 
value categories for each decile. The value premium is reduced by 2.6% and the returns on the 
value decile reduce by 4.18% from 28.95% to 24.77%. The fact that smaller companies tend 
to have lower P/E’s and therefore tend to appear in the value decile can be seen by looking at 
the ‘MV Category’ column. The value decile has an average MV category of 6.01, which is 
equivalent to an average market capitalisation of £44m in 2003. This rises to MV category 
11.65 (£190m) for the glamour decile.  
 
Overall, the reduction in returns caused by the bid-ask spread is serious but not catastrophic to 
a P/E-based strategy. If shares were sorted into deciles purely by size, we would expect 
spreads to reduce the value premium by the difference in bid-ask charges for MV categories 1 
and 2 compared to MV categories 19 and 20. From Table 9, this is 6.43%. In fact it is reduced 
by 2.6%, or only one-fifth of the value premium. This is partly because the glamour and value 
deciles are not made up exclusively of large and small shares respectively, and partly because 
not all shares are sold and re-bought annually. If shares ‘roll over’ from one year to the next 
because they appear in the same decile this reduces the spread costs. It is clear that the bid-ask 
spread can only account for a small proportion of the difference in returns between the value 
and glamour deciles. 
 
The final column of Table 10 shows the CAPM betas for each decile portfolio. These betas 
are very similar across the deciles, with slightly lower betas for the value decile than the 
  
 22 
growth decile. We thus find that, in common with previous studies, the value premium cannot 
be rationalised by risk in the sense of the CAPM.  
 
In Table 11 we consider whether book value-to-price and firm size would be equally useful 
discriminators of company stock performance. The table presents the extreme decile returns 
for stocks separately sorted using EP1, EP8, book value-to-price and market capitalisation for 
investment horizons of 1 to 8 years. We recalculate the EP1 and EP8 results since the analysis 
is now conducted on a smaller sample of 8,300 company-years for which book values are 
available. Incorporating eight years of earnings information into the EP statistic rather than 
just one year again results in a stronger value premium for this sub-sample of companies. 
There is also a clear size premium, with the smallest 10% of companies yielding stock returns 
around 12% higher than those of the largest 10% of companies for holding periods of up to 3 
years. For these shorter investment horizons, the size premium is similar in magnitude to the 
EP8 value premium. However, the size premium would be the most seriously affected by the 
differential bid-ask spreads between larger and smaller companies. Book value-to-price, the 
value measure favoured by Fama and French, is a stronger discriminator of returns that the 
traditional P/E ratio, but weaker than the modified P/E ratio that employs a longer history of 
earnings.  
 
We also checked whether the limited liquidity of some shares would have caused difficulties 
for investors. Datastream has daily turnover figures for most companies starting in 1987. We 
assumed a representative private investor with £50,000 to invest in 2003 and a hedge fund 
with £20m. We deflated these portfolio values going backwards in time by the average market 
return. For example, in 2002-2003 the average return was unusually negative at –15.22%, so 
our private portfolio value for 2002 was larger at £58,975. Table 12 shows the median number 
of days of turnover represented by the trades of these two sample investors, using EP1 and 
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EP8 to assign companies to deciles. For the private investor, the trades conducted usually 
represent only a small proportion of a day’s turnover in the shares, so he will rarely face 
liquidity problems. Investing in the glamour decile will also present no liquidity problems for 
the hedge fund even though its trades are 400 times as large, because the glamour decile 
consists mostly of large companies. Where problems are likely to occur is the value decile 
because small companies are concentrated here. For this decile the median trade represents 
3.37 days of turnover using EP1, so even a small institutional investor would often have to 
spread the required trades over several days to avoid moving the market adversely. However 
since the strategy is not particularly time-dependent, this is not likely to be a major issue. The 
liquidity problem is slightly worse using EP8, with a median trade size of 4.54 days’ turnover. 
 
7 Portfolio Illustration 
The following example shows the impact on returns of optimising the weights of the past 
eight years of earnings, compared to the original P/E. We calculated the performances of the 
value and glamour deciles identified using the (EP1+EPM8) statistic and compared them to 
the returns for the deciles calculated using the traditional P/E ratio EP1. All portfolios use 
annual rebalancing. The final values and compound returns are shown in Table 13 and the 
values of the four portfolios are shown graphically in Figure 6. The new value decile as 
calculated using (EP1+EPM8) outperforms the value decile from EP1 and the new glamour 
decile underperforms, so that the previous deciles are bracketed by the new deciles. Our use 
of a logarithmic scale in Figure 6 does not give a visual impression of dramatic 
outperformance or underperformance. However, over 29 years the compounding effect results 
in a new value decile worth almost twice as much as the old value decile, and a new glamour 
decile worth two-thirds the old glamour decile. The value premium is thus considerably 
enhanced. 
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8 Conclusion 
Graham and Dodd (1934) suggested that multiple years of earnings should be used to assess 
the long-term value of a company. Although using multiple years of earnings seems a very 
natural way of measuring fundamental value, we are not aware of any previous investigations 
into whether several years of earnings are more useful in predicting returns than one year. Our 
results suggest that a P/E calculated from multiple years of earnings is a better predictor of 
returns than the traditional one-year P/E. An eight-year average is twice as effective. However 
the difference between returns from the glamour and value deciles does not increase linearly 
as more past years are added into the calculation. Earnings from two or three years ago are 
particularly poor predictors. 
 
We examined several plausible weighting rules for the past years of earnings, using the subset 
of companies with a full eight years of positive normalised earnings. The individual earnings 
figures from five, six, seven or eight years ago, divided by the current share price, are better 
predictors of returns than the traditional P/E. This is testament to the limitations of the usual 
P/E ratio for predicting returns. We found that a sort statistic based on (EP1+EPM8) gave the 
best resolution between the value and glamour deciles, ignoring the other six earnings figures, 
as these two earnings figures have a relatively low correlation. This increased the value 
premium from 5.98% to 12.73%. 
 
Finally, we attempted to deal with three possible criticisms. We used rolling five-year data 
windows to show that the (EP1+EPM8) statistic or something very similar would have been 
the best statistic over most of the last 29 years, whenever a similar investigation had been 
performed and whatever retrospective period of data it used. We also showed that although 
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the bid-ask spread has a differential effect on the returns of the value and glamour deciles, it 
could only account for a small proportion of the value premium. We demonstrated that 
liquidity is only likely to present problems for an institutional investor buying the small 
company shares concentrated in the value decile. Even so, if the purchases are spread over 
several days then the price impacts are likely to be modest. 
 
The results presented in this paper suggest several potential avenues for further research. An 
obvious follow-on would be to determine whether these findings hold true in the much larger 
US market. We do not doubt that multiple years of earnings will be more useful than one, but 
it will be interesting to find out whether US earnings from two and three years ago should be 
negatively weighted and whether the earnings from five to eight years ago are better at 
predicting returns than the usual P/E. In the US case, transactions costs and illiquidity are 
likely to be even less of an issue. Finally, our results suggest the presence of a large and 
persistent value premium that would be hard to rationalise using standard asset pricing 
models. It is thus possible that behavioural explanations hold the key. Future research may 
examine competing psychological models in detail. 
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Table 1: One-year average returns for decile portfolios, 1975-2003. 
Panel A: Using all available data  
 EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 EP7 EP8 
Highest P/E 18.28% 18.20% 18.62% 16.65% 17.84% 17.83% 18.15% 16.26% 
Decile 2 19.25% 19.36% 16.41% 17.98% 16.94% 17.42% 16.16% 16.71% 
Decile 3 18.38% 17.32% 18.92% 18.68% 17.78% 17.51% 17.05% 16.43% 
Decile 4 16.44% 18.96% 19.45% 18.42% 19.49% 17.81% 18.61% 18.42% 
Decile 5 17.96% 18.06% 17.73% 18.58% 17.62% 19.11% 18.34% 19.54% 
Decile 6 18.53% 18.73% 19.32% 18.98% 19.97% 19.69% 19.81% 19.81% 
Decile 7 21.59% 19.53% 19.86% 20.77% 19.61% 20.18% 19.86% 19.39% 
Decile 8 20.86% 20.55% 21.33% 22.11% 21.81% 20.42% 20.58% 21.11% 
Decile 9 22.47% 21.75% 22.00% 22.08% 22.48% 22.88% 22.48% 23.05% 
Lowest P/E 24.26% 22.82% 21.89% 22.18% 24.27% 25.51% 27.57% 27.87% 
D10 – D1 5.98% 4.62% 3.28% 5.52% 6.44% 7.67% 9.42% 11.62% 
Panel B: Using only companies that have a full eight years of positive earnings 
 EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 EP7 EP8 
Highest P/E 18.03% 18.52% 19.31% 17.96% 17.72% 16.79% 17.20% 16.26% 
Decile 2 19.18% 17.42% 16.06% 16.49% 15.70% 15.86% 15.96% 16.71% 
Decile 3 18.05% 18.60% 18.20% 18.96% 17.72% 17.75% 17.29% 16.43% 
Decile 4 15.26% 17.25% 18.23% 17.58% 17.96% 18.17% 18.25% 18.42% 
Decile 5 19.56% 19.16% 18.64% 18.53% 18.48% 19.42% 18.10% 19.54% 
Decile 6 18.01% 19.51% 19.35% 18.91% 19.73% 20.03% 20.19% 19.81% 
Decile 7 19.72% 19.78% 20.53% 20.59% 20.12% 19.95% 19.91% 19.39% 
Decile 8 20.28% 21.33% 20.81% 21.03% 21.27% 19.77% 21.10% 21.11% 
Decile 9 24.11% 21.07% 21.48% 22.64% 23.59% 23.70% 23.16% 23.05% 
Lowest P/E 26.34% 25.93% 25.94% 25.92% 26.28% 27.14% 27.44% 27.87% 
D10 – D1 8.31% 7.41% 6.63% 7.96% 8.56% 10.35% 10.24% 11.62% 
Note: Companies are assigned to portfolios using statistics EP1 (the inverse of the usual P/E ratio) through to 
EP8 (the sum of normalised earnings over the last eight years, divided by the current share price). 
 
 
Table 2: Average returns for each decile for holding periods of 1 to 8 years 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 
Highest P/E 16.26% 14.43% 13.87% 13.80% 13.23% 13.48% 13.51% 13.20% 
Decile 2 16.71% 14.01% 13.58% 13.48% 13.77% 13.87% 14.05% 14.13% 
Decile 3 16.43% 14.85% 15.35% 15.27% 15.41% 15.33% 15.16% 14.98% 
Decile 4 18.42% 17.34% 17.46% 16.96% 16.15% 15.87% 15.46% 15.64% 
Decile 5 19.54% 17.37% 16.64% 16.24% 15.83% 15.77% 15.79% 15.74% 
Decile 6 19.81% 18.37% 17.92% 17.50% 17.13% 16.87% 16.03% 15.98% 
Decile 7 19.39% 18.85% 18.01% 17.69% 16.97% 16.85% 16.83% 16.80% 
Decile 8 21.11% 19.92% 20.12% 19.11% 18.28% 17.73% 17.49% 16.87% 
Decile 9 23.05% 22.26% 21.47% 20.28% 18.56% 18.19% 17.74% 17.39% 
Lowest P/E 27.87% 26.13% 25.31% 24.08% 22.23% 21.31% 20.98% 20.99% 
D10 – D1 11.62% 11.70% 11.44% 10.28% 9.01% 7.83% 7.47% 7.78% 
Notes: In this table we employ throughout only firms with a full eight years of earnings history. Companies are 
assigned to portfolios based on the sum of normalised earnings over the previous eight years. The one-year 
returns are repeated from the EP8 column of Table 1 Panel B. 
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Table 3: t-test p-values comparing EPn returns to EP1 returns, for n = 2, …, 8, and for  
1-year to 8-year holding periods. 
Panel A: Are the value decile returns different for EPn versus EP1? 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 
EP2 0.2245 0.2282 0.5483 0.7977 0.8593 0.4935 0.4271 0.0492* 
EP3 0.0879 0.3665 0.8460 0.7465 0.5853 0.2831 0.2521 0.1862 
EP4 0.1412 0.6869 0.5277 0.2430 0.1550 0.0736 0.0650 0.0532 
EP5 0.9911 0.2964 0.1765 0.0634 0.0605 0.0447* 0.0876 0.0619 
EP6 0.4330 0.0482* 0.0184* 0.0095** 0.0077** 0.0142* 0.0353* 0.0237* 
EP7 0.0629 0.0196* 0.0176* 0.0098** 0.0322* 0.0419* 0.0402* 0.0129* 
EP8 0.0864 0.0338* 0.0100* 0.0095** 0.0087** 0.0045** 0.0073** 0.0024** 
Panel B: Are the D10-D1 value premia different for EPn versus EP1? 
 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 8 Years 
EP2 0.6300 0.6357 0.8589 0.9239 0.4756 0.2002 0.2060 0.0228 
EP3 0.4172 0.9070 0.4665 0.6206 0.4652 0.4654 0.6144 0.1333 
EP4 0.8860 0.7017 0.2874 0.2916 0.1554 0.2260 0.2387 0.0754 
EP5 0.8905 0.3866 0.2154 0.1808 0.0878 0.1322 0.1017 0.0402* 
EP6 0.6261 0.1592 0.0462* 0.0430* 0.0202* 0.0472* 0.0219* 0.0036** 
EP7 0.3907 0.1318 0.0768 0.0626 0.0370* 0.1183 0.0337* 0.0022** 
EP8 0.1450 0.0678 0.0294* 0.0417* 0.0138* 0.0282* 0.0070** 0.0002*** 
Note: We match returns by year, decile and returns period, so that the only factor that varies is the number of 
years of past earnings taken into account. We then perform a paired sample, two-tailed t-test; *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4: Average one-year returns after assigning companies to decile portfolios using 
individual past years of earnings EP1 through to EPM8 
 EP1 
alone 
EPM2 
alone 
EPM3 
alone 
EPM4 
alone 
EPM5 
alone 
EPM6 
alone 
EPM7 
alone 
EPM8 
alone 
High P/E 18.03% 20.66% 19.72% 18.47% 16.14% 16.46% 16.39% 16.24% 
Decile 2 19.18% 18.06% 16.88% 16.61% 16.52% 17.10% 16.64% 17.05% 
Decile 3 18.05% 19.11% 18.78% 17.41% 16.15% 17.66% 18.01% 16.50% 
Decile 4 15.26% 19.31% 18.87% 18.23% 18.64% 16.30% 16.05% 18.32% 
Decile 5 19.56% 16.91% 18.22% 18.23% 19.35% 18.68% 20.65% 18.00% 
Decile 6 18.01% 19.19% 18.34% 19.19% 19.55% 20.99% 19.80% 20.44% 
Decile 7 19.72% 19.65% 19.96% 20.82% 20.45% 21.13% 18.73% 19.94% 
Decile 8 20.28% 20.51% 18.78% 21.67% 22.80% 20.60% 21.39% 22.23% 
Decile 9 24.11% 21.31% 23.93% 21.50% 21.87% 21.70% 23.22% 22.43% 
Low P/E 26.34% 23.86% 25.11% 26.46% 27.12% 27.97% 27.69% 27.40% 
D10 – D1 8.31% 3.20% 5.38% 7.99% 10.98% 11.51% 11.30% 11.15% 
Note: The EP1 returns are repeated from Table 1 Panel B. All UK stocks with eight years of positive earnings 
are used, 1975-2003. 
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Table 5: Average one-year returns after assigning companies to decile portfolios using 
different EP1-EPM8 weighting rules 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Increasing weights  Decreasing weights  Linear 
 Equal 
weights 
Linear Inverse 
square 
Linear Inverse 
square 
Regression 
Weights 
       
Weights assigned  
EP1 1 8 1 1 1/64 0.8442 
EPM2 1 7 ¼ 2 1/49 -0.1794 
EPM3 1 6 1/9 3 1/36 -0.3327 
EPM4 1 5 1/16 4 1/25 0.4347 
EPM5 1 4 1/25 5 1/16 0.1897 
EPM6 1 3 1/36 6 1/9 0.0223 
EPM7 1 2 1/49 7 ¼ 0.1235 
EPM8 1 1 1/64 8 1 0.0499 
       
One-Year Returns  
High P/E 16.26% 16.89% 17.84% 15.81% 15.19% 16.68% 
Decile 2 16.71% 16.30% 16.44% 16.05% 16.79% 14.83% 
Decile 3 16.43% 18.10% 18.03% 16.95% 16.52% 17.40% 
Decile 4 18.42% 17.24% 17.48% 18.35% 19.05% 17.60% 
Decile 5 19.54% 18.93% 17.96% 19.14% 19.00% 19.77% 
Decile 6 19.81% 19.66% 20.03% 20.69% 19.42% 18.28% 
Decile 7 19.39% 20.11% 20.76% 19.92% 20.80% 20.36% 
Decile 8 21.11% 20.79% 21.50% 20.27% 21.00% 22.33% 
Decile 9 23.05% 23.83% 20.77% 23.48% 23.84% 22.89% 
Low P/E 27.87% 26.68% 27.75% 27.98% 27.01% 28.45% 
D10 – D1 11.62% 9.79% 9.91% 12.17% 11.82% 11.77% 
Note: The data are all UK stocks with eight years of positive earnings, 1975-2003. Read each column as a 
separate calculation of returns over the 29 years, that first shows the weights applied, then the decile portfolio 
returns resulting from assigning companies to deciles using a P/E constructed from those weights. The equally-
weighted returns are repeated from Table 1 Panel B. 
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Table 6: Average one-year returns after assigning companies to decile portfolios using 
EP1 plus (EPM2 through to EPM8) 
 EP1 + 
EPM2 
EP1 + 
EPM3 
EP1 + 
EPM4 
EP1 + 
EPM5 
EP1 + 
EPM6 
EP1 + 
EPM7 
EP1 + 
EPM8 
        
Weights assigned 
EP1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EPM2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EPM3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EPM4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
EPM5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
EPM6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
EPM7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
EPM8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
        
One-Year Returns 
High P/E 18.52% 18.32% 17.32% 17.11% 16.76% 16.71% 16.21% 
Decile 2 17.42% 16.73% 16.37% 15.68% 16.86% 16.82% 16.15% 
Decile 3 18.60% 17.67% 16.79% 15.69% 15.68% 15.71% 17.27% 
Decile 4 17.25% 17.93% 17.68% 18.49% 17.47% 17.58% 16.55% 
Decile 5 19.16% 18.18% 17.49% 18.59% 18.74% 18.73% 20.03% 
Decile 6 19.51% 19.36% 20.36% 19.98% 19.49% 19.44% 18.13% 
Decile 7 19.78% 20.38% 21.41% 20.78% 21.12% 19.18% 20.06% 
Decile 8 21.33% 21.92% 22.53% 21.30% 20.81% 23.90% 23.34% 
Decile 9 21.07% 21.54% 21.69% 22.49% 23.43% 22.69% 21.92% 
Low P/E 25.93% 26.51% 26.95% 28.46% 28.25% 27.82% 28.95% 
D10 – D1 7.41% 8.19% 9.63% 11.36% 11.49% 11.12% 12.73% 
Note: All UK stocks with eight years of positive earnings are used, 1975-2003. 
 
 
Table 7: Correlations between the eight individual past years of earnings 
 EPM7 EPM6 EPM5 EPM4 EPM3 EPM2 EP1 
EPM8 0.8267 0.6984 0.6320 0.5415 0.4762 0.3779 0.2765 
EPM7  0.8180 0.7258 0.6095 0.5324 0.4263 0.2959 
EPM6   0.8023 0.6553 0.5493 0.4209 0.3012 
EPM5    0.8180 0.6602 0.5137 0.3431 
EPM4     0.7954 0.6100 0.3891 
EPM3      0.7317 0.4702 
EPM2       0.6136 
Note: All UK stocks with eight years of positive earnings are used, 1975-2003. 
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Table 8: Summary statistics from calculating individual year resolutions for various 
weighting rules, 1975-2003 
 
Equal 
weights 
Linear 
Regression 
Linear 
descending 
weights, 
EPM8 largest 
Linear 
ascending 
weights, EP1 
largest 
EP1+EPM8 
EP1 
+EPM4 
+EPM8 
Average 
resolution 
11.62% 11.77% 12.15% 9.79% 12.73% 13.13% 
Standard 
deviation 
21.01% 17.31% 20.49% 21.13% 20.17% 21.08% 
Number of 
years that 
rule is best 
3 6 5 1 10 4 
Note: The ‘best in n years’ figure is based on calculating the difference between the glamour and value deciles 
for each year individually from 1975 to 2003 for each weighting rule. It shows the number of years in which that 
rule gave the highest resolution. 
 
 
Table 9: Average bid-ask spread costs on one-year returns, grouping by market value 
category, 1987-2003 
MV Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Total spread 8.20% 6.92% 5.72% 4.62% 4.42% 4.32% 3.59% 3.42% 3.04% 2.65% 
           
MV Category 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Total spread 2.42% 2.37% 2.24% 1.93% 1.72% 1.60% 1.58% 1.53% 1.32% 0.95% 
Note: Bid and ask prices are only available from Datastream starting in 1987. 
 
Table 10: Compound annual returns, average market value category (1-20) and average 
market betas for ‘EP1+EPM8’ with and without the effect of the bid-ask spread on 
returns. 
 
Return 
Return net 
of spread 
MV 
Category 
Beta 
High P/E 16.21% 14.64% 11.65 1.0232 
Decile 2 16.15% 13.93% 12.64 0.9594 
Decile 3 17.27% 14.78% 12.72 0.9905 
Decile 4 16.55% 13.99% 12.16 0.9589 
Decile 5 20.03% 17.26% 11.69 0.9440 
Decile 6 18.13% 15.12% 11.03 0.9266 
Decile 7 20.06% 16.67% 10.04 0.9577 
Decile 8 23.34% 19.59% 9.20 0.9123 
Decile 9 21.92% 18.08% 7.91 0.9277 
Low P/E 28.95% 24.77% 6.01 0.9998 
D10 - D1 12.73% 10.13% - - 
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Table 11: Returns for extreme deciles of portfolios sorted by EP1, EP8, book value-to-
price and market capitalisation, over holding periods of 1 to 8 years 
Sort by Portfolio 
1  
Year 
2  
Years 
3  
Years 
4 
Years 
5  
Years 
6 
Years 
7 
Years 
8 
Years 
 
EP1 
Decile 1 13.65% 16.28% 13.85% 13.91% 13.00% 13.17% 13.09% 13.28% 
Decile 10 20.85% 22.81% 21.83% 20.16% 19.01% 17.53% 16.93% 16.64% 
D10 - D1 7.21% 6.52% 7.98% 6.25% 6.01% 4.36% 3.84% 3.36% 
          
 
EP8 
Decile 1 11.65% 14.13% 11.11% 9.93% 9.82% 10.00% 9.90% 10.51% 
Decile 10 23.19% 25.34% 23.72% 21.75% 20.79% 18.62% 18.03% 17.76% 
D10 - D1 11.54% 11.20% 12.61% 11.82% 10.97% 8.62% 8.13% 7.25% 
          
Book 
value- 
to-price 
Decile 1 14.47% 16.50% 14.00% 12.93% 12.67% 12.74% 12.46% 12.53% 
Decile 10 22.82% 25.09% 23.45% 22.23% 20.98% 18.90% 17.98% 17.47% 
D10 - D1 8.35% 8.59% 9.45% 9.30% 8.31% 6.16% 5.52% 4.94% 
          
Market 
capital-
isation 
Decile 1 10.91% 12.14% 11.87% 11.89% 12.12% 12.45% 12.53% 12.58% 
Decile 10 22.69% 25.30% 24.00% 21.84% 19.81% 17.74% 16.74% 16.41% 
D10 - D1 11.78% 13.16% 12.12% 9.95% 7.69% 5.29% 4.21% 3.83% 
 
 
Table 12: Median number of days of turnover represented by each trade, for a private 
investor with ₤50,000 in 2003 and for a hedge fund with ₤20m. EP1 and EP8 are used to 
assign companies to deciles. 
 EP1  EP8  
Decile Days of turnover 
for private investor 
Days of turnover 
for hedge fund 
Days of turnover 
for private investor 
Days of turnover 
for hedge fund 
High P/E 0.0023 0.93 0.0005 0.20 
2 0.0009 0.38 0.0005 0.18 
3 0.0013 0.51 0.0004 0.17 
4 0.0008 0.30 0.0004 0.15 
5 0.0008 0.32 0.0007 0.26 
6 0.0011 0.42 0.0008 0.31 
7 0.0015 0.62 0.0008 0.33 
8 0.0021 0.84 0.0022 0.89 
9 0.0035 1.41 0.0058 2.30 
Low P/E 0.0084 3.37 0.0114 4.54 
 
 
 
Table 13: Portfolio values and percentage returns for glamour and value deciles using 
EP1 and (EP1+EPM8) to assign companies to deciles, 1975-2003 
 EP1+EPM8  EP1 (traditional EP)  
 Value Decile Glamour Decile Value Decile Glamour Decile 
Value in 1975 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 
Value in 2004 £952,028 £44,539 £548,274 £70,350 
Compound 
Return 26.68% 13.99% 24.29% 15.80% 
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Figure 1: Average annual returns using EP1 and EP8 as rules for assignment of 
companies to decile portfolios. All UK stocks, 1975-2003 
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Figure 2: Standard deviation of one-year returns, 1975-2003 
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Figure 3: Sharpe ratio of returns for a one-year holding period, 1975-2003 
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Figure 4: Five-year rolling average resolutions (value premia) for different simple 
weighting regimes, 1975-2003 
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Figure 5: Average cost of the bid-ask spread to one-year returns grouped by market 
value category, 1987-2003 
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Figure 6: Portfolio values for the value and glamour deciles using EP1 and (EP1+EPM8) 
to sort companies into deciles, annual rebalancing, 1975-2003 
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